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may lead to a reversal of the conviction, even if they were not brought
to the attention of the trial court.4 A certification by the district court
that the claim is frivolous carries great weight in determining whether
leave to appeal should be granted, but this certification is not conclu-
sive.5 Counsel must be appointed for the petitioner if he challenges
the certification of the trial court.6
In a similar case where the prosecution had asked prejudicial
questions the Court ordered a full transcript since the government
failed to effectively controvert the claim of error. The Court ruled the
defendant did not have an adequate opportunity to show the error
was not frivolous.
7
In the principal case, the concurring Justices gave a strong indica-
tion of what their decision would be if an indigent defendant petitions
the Supreme Court with the same attorney that represented him at
the trial court. The four concurring Justices agreed that the indigent
defendant should be granted a full transcript as a matter of course.
Justice Douglas indicated he would also agree to the full transcript.
This decision is another step toward the equalization of due
process for all defendants in criminal trials in federal courts. The
federal judicial system will arrive at this equalization only when it
accepts the view presented by the concurring opinion. Only then will
all persons receive due process of law in the federal courts.
Appeal is not a matter of right in the state courts.8 A state can
make an appeal a right, but they can only do it in a non-discriminatory
fashion; therefore some form of appeal must be provided for indigent
defendants. 9 Kentucky has already solved the indigent problem by
not only -roviding them with the right to appeal, 10 but also furnishing
them with the entire transcript of the trial."
Marshall Loy
TORTS-NEGaUGENCE-MALPRAUCE-ABi-!DONMENT OF PATmNT.-Dece-
dent, a forty-six year old colored man, had been shot in the neck and
promptly taken to the hospital about one o'clock in the morning. He
was bloody, breathing with difficulty, vomiting, and in a critical
condition. Defendant was called to attend him and after administering
4 Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).
5Johnson v. United States, 852 U.S. 565 (1957).
6 Ibid.
7 Farley v. United States, 854 U.S. 521, 523 (1957).8 McIntosh v. Commonwealth, 868 S.W.2d 331, 335 (Ky. 1963).
9 Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
10 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 453.190 (1958).
"Ky. Rev. Stat. § 28.440(1) (1956).
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preparatory treatment defendant returned home. Decedent's condition
worsened and another doctor was called. When he arrived, he found
the decedent in shock with "bubbling blood within the bronchial tubes
and blood coming out of his mouth." After finally securing the
decedents release from the defendant, the doctor operated, but the
patient died as a result of the injuries. Decedent's family then brought
action against the defendant for negligent practice charged to have
been the proximate cause of the decedent's death. The trial court
directed the verdict for the defendant and the plaintiff appealed.
Held Reversed. Whether the defendant abandoned decedent at a
crucial time was a jury question. Johnson v. Vaughn, 370 S.W.2d 591
(Ky. 1963).
This case shows the perplexity in determining whether a doctor's
abandonment of a patient constitutes culpable dereliction of his duty.
There are four issues which should be examined in fixing culpability
for abandonment: (1) what is the duty of the physician; (2) whether
there was abandonment in the legal sense; (3) whether the abandon-
ment was justified; (4) whether it was a breach of the duty owed by
the defendant to the patient.
It is a general rule that a physician or surgeon on undertaking an
operation or treatment is under a duty to continue this attendance
-after the operation or first treatment as long as the case requires
attention.' The defendant undertook the treatment of the decedent;
therefore, he was under the duty ". . . to devote his best skill and
attention, but not to leave a patient precipitately, without making ar-
rangements which might be reasonably concluded to accomplish
favorable results."2
It is a matter of interpretation whether the defendant's leaving the
decedent constituted abandonment in the legal sense. Abandonment
as a cause for malpractice must be voluntary, with or without the
intention to return, and without the consent of the patient. In the
present case defendant intended to return, but he failed to do so. He
left voluntarily without the consent of the patient.
It was alleged that the defendant negligently abandoned the
decedent. It is questionable whether or not he had legal justification.
Consent of the parties will justify abandonment; 3 lack of cooperation
is also justification.4 The defendant was not ill nor was there any
indication the decedent would not cooperate. Defendant's demand
for twenty-five dollars before releasing the decedent to the other doctor
170 C.J.S. Physicians & Surgeons § 48 (1951).
2 Williams v. Tarter, 286 Ky. 717, 151 S.W.2d 783, 786 (1941).
3 41 Am. Jur. Physicians & Surgeons § 72 (1942).
4 Urrutia v. Patino, 297 S.W. 512 (Tex. Civ. App. 1927).
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suggests he may have worried about payment for his services. In a
somewhat different case, but similar circumstances, it was held a
question for the jury whether the doctor's refusal to treat the patient
who owed him money was legal justification for abandonment.5
It is an accepted rule, that where evidence is so clear and con-
vincing that reasonable minds could not differ in their conclusions,
the question of the defendant's guilt or innocence is for the court, not
for the jury.6 In this case the court left to the jury the question
whether or not the defendant's conduct was a breach of his duty to the
decedent. This decision was in accordance with an earlier decision
of the court which held that a surgeon was not negligent as a matter
of law in leaving the hospital while the patient was still in shock and
obviously in critical condition following an operation.
7
There is no doubt but that the court was correct in reversing the
directed verdict for the defendant. All the elements necessary in
constituting malpractice through abandonment are evident in this
case. Even though the court could not rule as a matter of law that
the defendant was guilty of dereliction of his duty, the remanding
of the case for another trial will afford ample opportunity for the
jury to find for the plaintiff.
Scotty Baesler
CONTRAcrs-ADAMS v. LINDSELL RuLE-UNJUsTm'r SIGNIFICANCE PLACED
ON Loss OF CONmOL.-Appellants, as purchasers, executed a con-
tract for the sale and purchase of certain property and mailed the
contract to appellees. Appellees executed the contract and mailed it
to appellants' attorney. After mailing the contract, but prior to its
receipt, appellees called appellants' attorney and cancelled the con-
tract. Appellants nevertheless recorded the contract upon its receipt.
Appellees sought to have the appellants enjoined from making any
claim under the recorded land purchase contract. Appellants counter-
claimed, seeking specific performance. The lower court entered a
summary decree for the appellees. Held: Reversed. Where an offer
is by mail the letter of acceptance completes the contract the moment
it is posted. Morrison v. Thoelke, 155 So. 2d 889 (Fla. 1963).
The principal case is not unusual because of any departure from
well-established contract law, but because of the thorough discussion
given the "Adams v. Lindsell Doctrine." The arguments both for and
5 Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).6Droppelman v. Willingham, 293 Ky. 614, 169 S.W.2d 811, 814 (1943).
Engle v. Clarke, 846 S.W.2d 13 (Ky. 1961).
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